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Abstract
A key-agreement protocol (KAP) is a multi-party algorithm de.ned by a sequence of steps
specifying the actions required for two or more individuals to each obtain a shared secret. A
brief introduction to an axiomatic basis for non-abelian KAPs is presented. The security of these
protocols is related to the di2culty of solving equations in non-linear algebraic structures. In
particular, it is shown that well known hard problems in group theory can be used to generate
key agreement protocols. Concrete examples of such KAPs are discussed and the axiomatic
method is shown to subsume other braid group KAPs. The paper concludes with a snapshot of
methods and examples currently under investigation.
? 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Axiomatics for non-abelian key agreement protocols
A protocol is a multi-party algorithm, de.ned by a sequence of steps, specifying the
actions required of two or more individuals in order to achieve a speci.ed objective. A
key-agreement protocol (KAP) is a protocol whereby a shared secret becomes available
to two or more individuals for further cryptographic applications. A new class of
non-abelian key agreement protocols was introduced in [2,3] and further developed in
[4]. The security of these protocols is based on the di2culty of solving systems of
equations over algebraic structures, in particular groups, a well known class of hard
problems. Solutions of equations over algebraic structures are generally thought to be
very hard and in some cases even provably unsolvable. We review the non-abelian key
agreement protocols and later discuss some speci.c examples.
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Consider the 5-tuple:
(U;V; ; 1; 2);
where U and V are feasibly computable monoids, and
 :U ×U → V;
i :U × V → V (i = 1; 2)
satisfy the following axioms:
Axiom (i): For all x; y1; y2 ∈U
(x; y1 · y2) = (x; y1) · (x; y2):
Axiom (ii): For all x; y∈U
1(x; (y; x)) = 2(y; (x; y)):
Axiom (iii): Assume y1; y2; : : : ; yk ∈U,
(x; y1); (x; y2); : : : ; (x; yk)
are publicly known for some secret element x∈U. Then, in general, determining x is
not feasible.
We now describe the protocol as a sequence of steps. Alice and Bob are each
assigned public submonoids,
SA; SB ⊆ U;
respectively.
Suppose SA is generated by the elements
{s1; : : : ; sm}
and SB is generated by
{t1; : : : ; tn}:
Alice begins by secretly choosing an element a∈ SA and publicly announces the list:
(a; t1); (a; t2); : : : ; (a; tn):
Likewise, Bob secretly chooses an element b∈ SB and publicly announces the list:
(b; s1); (b; s2); : : : ; (b; sm):
Alice, knowing a as an element in SA,
a=
∏
i
se(i)i (e(i) are secret)
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can compute
(b; a) =
∏
i
(b; si)e(i):
Bob, knowing b as an element in SB,
b=
∏
i
tf(i)i (f(i) are secret)
can compute
(a; b) =
∏
i
(a; ti)f(i):
At this point Alice knows a and (b; a). Likewise, Bob knows b and (a; b).
They can now both compute the shared secret  where
= 1(a; (b; a))
= 2(b; (a; b)):
We now compare the well-known Di2e–Hellman key agreement protocol and the new
non-abelian key agreement protocol.
Die–Hellman KAP
Public information:
u,
C = large class of commuting one-way functions.
Alice’s:
Secret key: f∈C
Public key: f(u)
Bob’s:
Secret key: g∈C
Public key: g(u)
Shared secret: f(g(u)).
Non-abelian KAP
Public information:
U; V; ; 1; 2; SA; SB satisfying axioms (i)–(iii).
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Alice’s:
Secret key: a∈ SA
Public key: (a; ti)
Bob’s:
Secret key: b∈ Sb
Public key: (b; sj)
Shared secret: 1(a; (b; a)).
2. Intractable problems in combinatorial group theory
Informally, a .nitely presented group G is speci.ed by a .nite set of generators
g1; g2; : : : ; gn;
where every g∈G is a word in the generators and their inverses (product of gi’s and
their inverses). Further, there are .nitely many words
r1; r2; : : : ; rm
called relators and each ri de.nes the identity element of G.
It is usual to suppress the trivial relations such as
gig−1i = g
−1
i gi = e:
A presentation is written as {g1; g2; : : : ; gn | r1; r2; : : : ; rm}.
Examples. The 4nite cyclic group of order n has presentation: {g | gn}. The modular
group on two generators:
{g1; g2 | g21; g32}:
The study of equations in .nitely presented groups took on signi.cance with the work
of Max Dehn (1910–1912) [6] who formulated several now well-known problems.
Fix a presentation
G = {g1; : : : ; gn | r1; : : : ; rm}:
Word problem. Is there an algorithm to determine if an arbitrary word in G de4nes
the identity element?
Conjugacy problem. Is there an algorithm to determine if two arbitrary words v; w
∈G de4ne conjugate elements, i.e. to determine if there exists x∈G such that
w = x−1vx:
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The following important progress has been made on these conjectures. In 1955
Novikov and Boone [6] constructed .nitely presented groups whose word problem
is algorithmically unsolvable. In 1971 Miller III [7] constructed a .nitely presented
residually .nite group (this means g1 	= g2 can be distinguished in some .nite im-
age) with an algorithmically unsolvable conjugacy problem. Note that residually .nite
groups have a solvable word problem.
3. Concrete examples of non-abelian key agreement protocols
We now present concrete examples of the above general non-abelian protocol (based
on the theory of in.nite non-abelian groups) for secret key establishment between
two parties whose only means of communication is a public channel. The security of
the method is founded on the di2culty of solving the conjugacy problem in in.nite
non-abelian groups.
Recall that the general non-abelian KAP (key agreement protocol) was based on the
existence of a 5-tuple
U; V; ; 1; 2
satisfying axioms (i)–(iii). We now present two examples of this KAP in the case that
U = V = G where G is an in.nite .nitely presented non-abelian group.
We now choose
U = V = G = group;
(x; y) = x−1yx;
1(u; v) = u−1v; 2(u; v) = v−1u:
Non-abelian KAP I
Public information:
G = .nitely generated non-abelian group.
Two subgroups of G:
SA = 〈s1; s2; : : : ; sm〉;
SB = 〈t1; t2; : : : ; tn〉:
Secret keys:
Alice’s secret key a∈ SA,
Bob’s secret key b∈ SB.
Public keys:
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Alice’s public key
a−1t1a; a−1t2a; : : : ; a−1tna;
Bob’s public key
b−1s1b; b−1s2b; : : : ; b−1smb:
Shared secret:
a−1b−1ab:
Security of the method:
The Simultaneous Conjugacy Problem.
Non-abelian KAP II
Let G denote a non-abelian group with an intractable conjugacy problem.
Assume G contains two commuting subgroups
SA = 〈s1; s2; : : : ; sm〉;
TB = 〈t1; t2; : : : ; tn〉
i.e., for all h∈ SA and k ∈TB
hk = kh:
Public information:
p∈G = .nitely generated non-abelian group.
Two commuting subgroups of G:
SA = 〈s1; s2; : : : ; sm〉;
SB = 〈t1; t2; : : : ; tn〉:
Secret keys:
Alice’s secret key a∈ SA,
Bob’s secret key b∈ SB.
Public key:
Alice’s public key
a−1pa;
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Bob’s public key
b−1pb:
Shared secret:
a−1b−1pab:
Security of the method:
Conjugacy Problem.
The above method in the special case of the braid group, was .rst presented by
Ko et al. [5]. We will now show that this scheme is, in fact, a special case of the
general non-abelian KAP for a suitable choice of the 5-tuple: (U;V; ; 1; 2) satisfying
the axioms (i)–(iii).
Let S be a set which contains an element e. We can make S into a monoid by
de.ning a law of composition ◦ as follows:
e ◦ x = x ◦ e = x (for all x∈ S);
x ◦ y = x (for all x; y∈ S; x 	= e; y 	= e):
Choose U to be the braid group BN . Fix a public element p∈BN . De.ne V (.rst
as a set) to be the set of conjugates
V = {xpx−1 | x∈BN}:
Then V is a monoid with identity p and law of composition ◦ as de.ned above. We
now de.ne ; 1; 2.
De*nition. We de.ne
(x; y) = xpx−1 ∈V
for all x; y∈BN .
Clearly,  satis.es axiom (i). We now let C(p) denote the centralizer of p in BN .
Let x1; x2; : : : ; xN−1 denote the Artin generators for BN , and for some 1¡‘¡N − 1
de.ne subgroups A; B, where A is generated by x1; : : : ; x‘−1 and B is generated by
x‘+1; : : : ; xN−1.
De*nition. We de.ne
1(u; v) =


p if u 	∈ A · C(p);
p if u∈A · C(p) and v 	= bpb−1 for all b∈B;
ava−1 otherwise (where u∈ a · C(p)):
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One checks that this de.nition is well de.ned and independent of the choice of a.
Similarly,
De*nition. We de.ne
2(u; v) =


p if u 	∈ B · C(p);
p if u∈B · C(p) and v 	= apa−1 for all a∈A;
bvb−1 otherwise (where u∈ b · C(p)):
One easily checks that axiom (ii) is satis.ed. With these choices one obtains pre-
cisely the public-key scheme introduced in [5]. This demonstrates that the public key
scheme introduced in [5] is a special case of the general algebraic protocol given in
[2,3].
4. Requirements for a group theory KAP
The minimum requirements for a group theory KAP based on an in.nite non-abelian
group G are:
• A fast method is required to rewrite a set of conjugates in G:
a−1t1a; a−1t2a; : : : ; a−1tma
so they become unrecognizable.
• A key extractor is required.
A key extractor E is determined by a set K (Keyspace) and is a map
E :G → K
from the group G to K , such that each element g∈G (regardless of the way it is
expressed in the generators of G) is mapped to a unique key E(g). In order to insure
that the process of key extraction should eventually give a bitstring which is distributed
close to uniformly, it is necessary, in practice, to apply a hash function to the internal bit
representation of one of the invariants. We shall simply assume that this is incorporated
in E and not discuss it further.
4.1. Rewriting methods
There are two basic methods for rewriting. The .rst method is the canonical form
method. This method requires the existence of a canonical form on the group G.
Examples of groups with canonical forms include:
• Fundamental groups of graphs of groups (via Bass–Serre theory, see [8]).
• One relator groups (via the Magnus approach see [6]).
• Classes of two relator groups (see [1]).
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• Groups which come from low dimensional topology (via Thurston’s work on three
manifolds (see [9]).
The second method for rewriting is the subgroup method. This method requires the
existence of a subgroup
H6G;
where a method of rewriting (i.e., a method to make words in H unrecognizable) is
already known in the subgroup H . For example, the subgroup could have a canonical
form.
Now, every g∈G can be written in the form
g= +(g) · Lg;
where +(g) is a word in H (i.e., it is expressed in the generators of H) and Lg∈G is
a coset representative.
Method. Rewrite +(g) and then express +(g) as a word in the generators of G.
Remark. If one subgroup H with rewriting method exists, then one usually has a
family of such subgroups given by the orbit of the action of the automorphism group
of G acting on H . Since the choice of H is entirely private, an attacker cannot use
properties of H to try to break the system. Since the result of this method is a word in
the generators of the group G, this process can be iterated several times, using various
subgroups where one has methods of rewriting, to strengthen the system.
Examples of groups where this subgroup rewriting is a natural choice arise from the
theory of extensions of groups, i.e., groups with non-trivial higher cohomology groups.
4.2. Key extraction methods
• Canonical forms.
• In the case of the Braid group, knot polynomials.
• Applying a homomorphism to a very large .nite group.
• Computing an invariant in an image group.
Examples of group invariants include:
• The Nielsen invariant of groups with in.nite cyclic abelianizations.
• The relation module and its applications.
• The nilpotent quotients of classes of solvable groups and Burnside groups.
• Low-dimensional homology and cohomology.
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